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Abstract
This work considers optimisation problems under Rawls and maximin with mul-
tiple discount factors criteria. It proves that though these criteria are different,
they have the same optimal value and solution.
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1 Introduction
Consider the following classical problem: given a stock of renewable resource, what
is the good inter-temporal exploitation, considering the welfare of generations of
today and future?
The famous Ramsey criterion, using a constant discount rate and largely used in
researches about economic dynamic, is criticized by the weak weighting parameters
for generations in distant future. The evaluation of each utilities stream is quasi-
determined by a finite number of generations. It raises the concerns that following
Ramsey criterion, the economy does not leave enough resource to future.
∗The author acknowledges the LABEX MME-DII (ANR-11-LBX-0023-01) for supports dur-
ing the completion of this work.
†EPEE, University of Evry, University Paris-Saclay; TIMAS, Thang Long University
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In the classical work "Theory of justice", Rawls [18] assumes that if one is cached
behind a veil of ignorance, in the total lack of information about the condition
under which she1 will be born, the economic agent should choose the maximization
of the least favoured generation. Precisely, given a inter-temporal consumption
streams, her evaluation criterion of inter-temporal utilities streams should be
U(c0, c1, c2, . . . ) = inf
s≥0
u(cs),
where u(ct) is the utility of the t
th generation, given ct as the consumed resource.
We can consider the question of Rawls in another way: the economic agent may
be ambiguous about what is the "good" discount factor to be chosen in evaluating
utilities streams. Her set of possible discount factor is (0, 1). Being in the total
lack of information, for given consumption stream {cs}
∞
s=0, she should evaluate it
as2
U(c0, c1, c2, . . . ) = inf
δ∈(0,1)
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu(cs)
]
.
This criterion can be also be considered as an application of Rawls’s spirit in
the configuration where there exist disagreements between people in the economy
about how to discount the future. The social planer choose a criterion which
maximizes the least favoured person.
Naturally, raises the question about the behaviour of the economy under the Rawls
criteria. The first Rawls criterion is well studied in seminar contributions of Arrow
[2], Solow [16] and Calvo [5]. The result is clear: the behaviour of the economy
strongly depends on the initial stock. If the stock of renewable resource is below
the golden rule (the level of stock allowing a maximal level of constant consump-
tion), the optimal exploitation is to keep the stock remains constant over time.
In the case of abundant renewable resource stock, which is higher than the golden
1We use female pronouns as a convenient default.
2For the axiomatic foundation and discussion about the importance normalizing term 1− δ,
see Chambers & Echenique [6] and Drugeon & al [10]. Observe that for any 0<δ< 1, we have
(1− δ)
∑
∞
s=0
δs = 1.
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rule, there are infinite number of solutions and every optimal path converges de-
creasingly to this level.
The purpose of this work is to study the same question under the second Rawls
criterion. We prove that for low level of resource stock (under the golden rule),
the unique solution is to keep the stock constant through time and solutions under
two criteria are coincided. For the case of abundant resource, the solution under
the first criteria is the solution under the second one, and the value functions are
equal.
Section 2 introduces the two Rawlsian problems, the main properties of the first
one and solves the second one. Section 3 discusses different criterion studied in
the literature.
2 The two Rawlsian criteria
2.1 Fundamentals
Denote by u the instantaneous utility function and f the regeneration function
of renewable resource. These two functions are supposed to be strictly increasing
and concave. The concavity of the utility function is strict. In order to simplify
the presentation, suppose that f ′(0)> 1
δ
and f ′(∞)< 1.
Denote by x the golden rule, the capital accumulation corresponding to the max-
imum level of constant consumption: x is solution to f ′(x) = 1.
For any given capital stock x0 ≥ 0, denote by Π(x0) the set of feasible paths of
stock {xs}
∞
s=0: for any s, 0 ≤ xs+1 ≤ f(xs).
For each discount rate 0<δ < 1, it is well known in dynamic programming litera-
ture3 that the optimal capital accumulation path corresponding to δ is monotonic
and converges to xδ, the solution to equation f ′(x) = 1
δ
.
For each feasible stock path x = {xs}
∞
s=0, the inter-temporal evaluation of the
3See Stokey, Lucas with Prescott [17].
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corresponding consumption path {cs}
∞
s=0 with cs = f(xs)− xs+1 for any s ≥ 0, is
given as
ν(x) = inf
s≥0
u(cs).
2.2 The classical Rawls criterion
The famous Rawls criterion, embedded in the optimal growth context, can be
considered as the following optimisation problem, which is well studied in Arrow
[2], Solow [16] and Calvo [5]. The economic agent solves:
max
[
inf
s≥0
u(cs)
]
,
under the constraint ct + xs+1 ≤ f(xs) for all s, with x0 > 0 given.
The Lemma 2.1 establish the foundation for the existence of optimal solution and
fundamental properties of the value function.
Lemma 2.1. i) For any x0 ≥ 0, the set of feasible paths Π(x0) is compact in
product topology.
ii) The function ν is upper semi-continuous for the product topology.
iii) There exists x∗ ∈ Π(x0) such that
ν
(
x
∗
)
= max
x∈Π(x0)
ν
(
x
)
.
Proposition 2.1 gives the behaviour of the optimal path, which strongly depends
on the initial condition, with the golden rule x as the critical threshold.
Proposition 2.1. i) Consider the case 0 ≤ x0 ≤ x. The problem has unique
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solution x∗ = (x0, x0, . . .) and
max
x∈Π(x0)
ν(x) = ν(x∗)
= u (f(x0)− x0) .
ii) Consider the case x is finite and x0>x. The problem has an infinite number
of solutions which all converge to x. And
max
x∈Π(x0)
ν(x) = u (f(x)− x) .
For initial capital stock x0 smaller than x, the optimal choice is to remain in the
status quo. The unique solution x∗ satisfies x∗s = x0 for any s ≥ 0. The optimal
value is u (f(x0)− x0). For x0 bigger than x, there exists an infinite number
of solution, every optimal stock path converges to x and the optimal value is
u (f(x)− x).
2.3 The second Rawlsian criterion and the equivalence
between the two criteria
In [10], Drugeon & al consider the optimisation problem with multiple discount
factors under the maximin criteria. Let D= [δ, δ] representing the set of possible
discount factors, the economic agent solves:
maxmin
δ∈D
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu(cs)
]
s.c cs + xs+1 ≤ f(xs) for any s,
x0 is given.
For each feasible stock path x = {xs}
∞
s=0, let cs = f(xs)− xs+1 for any s ≥ 0 and
νˆ(x) = inf
0<δ< 1
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu(cs)
]
.
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Since the functions u and f satisfy the standard conditions in growth theory, for
each discount factor δ, the optimal path of Ramsey problem corresponding to δ
converges monotonically to xδ the solution to
f ′(x) =
1
δ
.
Moreover, it is easy to verify that
lim
δ→0
xδ = 0,
lim
δ→1
xδ = x.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume continuity property. For the details of
conditions ensuring this, curious readers can refer to the article of Le Van &
Morhaim [14], with the most important condition being tail insensitivity one.
Assumption A1. For any 0<δ < 1, χ ∈ Π(x0), define the function
v(δ, χ) = (1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
u
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)
.
For each fixed δ, the function v(δ, ·) is upper semi-continuous in product topology,
in respect to the second argument.
Proposition 2.2 gives a detailed description of the optimal path under the multiple
discount factors and the second Rawlsian criterion.
Proposition 2.2. Assume that 0<δ ≤ δ < 1. Denote by χ∗ the unique optimal
path for the maximin problem.
i) For x0 ≤ x
δ, χ∗ coincides with the optimal path of the Ramsey problem with
discount factor δ, increasing and converges to xδ.
ii) For xδ ≤ x0 ≤ x
δ, for any s, x∗s = x0. The optimal path χ
∗ coincides with the
optimal solution of Ramsey problem with discount factor δ satisfying xδ = x0.
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iii) For x0 ≥ x
δ, χ∗ coincides with the optimal path of the Ramsey problem with
discount factor δ, decreasing and converges to xδ.
The figure 1, taken in Drugeon & al [10], gives us an illustration for the dependence
of optimal paths in initial condition.
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Figure 1: The optimal policy function in multiple discount factors configuration
By technical difficulties relying with the fixed point arguments, Drugeon & al [10]
assume that D is a closed set belonging to (0, 1): 0<δ ≤ δ < 1. Intuitively, under
the result in Proposition 2.2 we can hope that for D= (0, 1): δ converges to zero,
and δ converges to 1, the two Ralwsian problems have the same value function:
for D= (0, 1), we get max
x∈Π(x0) ν(x) = maxx∈Π(x0) νˆ(x).
Proposition 2.3. For any x0 ≥ 0,
i) We have
max
χ∈Π(x0)
inf
s≥0
u
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)
= max
χ∈Π(x0)
[
inf
0<δ<1
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
u
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)]
.
ii) For 0 ≤ x0 ≤ x, two Rawlsian problems have the same solution x
∗ = (x0, x0, x0, . . . ).
iii) For x0>x, every solution under the first Rawlsian criterion is solution under
the second one.
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Proof. (i) In order to facilitate the exposition, for each 0<δ < 1, denote by {xs(δ)}
∞
s=0
the optimal path of Ramsey problem corresponding to the discount factor δ.
Observe that for any feasible path of stock {xs}
∞
s=0 belonging to Π(x0):
inf
s≥0
u
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)
≤ inf
0<δ< 1
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)]
.
This implies
max
χ∈Π(x0)
min
s≥0
u
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)
≤ max
χ∈Π(x0)
[
inf
0<δ<1
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)]
.
Now we will prove the converse inequality.
Consider first the case 0<x0<x. Fix 0<δ < δ < 1 such that x
δ <x0<x
δ.
Define χ∗ = (x0, x0, . . . ), which is the unique optimal path for the maximin cri-
terion with the set of discount rates D = [δ, δ]. For any feasible path χ 6= χ∗,
following Drugeon & al [10], we have
inf
0<δ<1
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
u
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)]
≤ inf
δ≤δ≤δ
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
u
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)]
< inf
δ≤δ≤δ
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
u
(
f(x∗s)− x
∗
s+1
)]
= u
(
f(x0)− x0
)
= max
χ∈Π(x0)
[
inf
s≥0
u
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)]
.
This implies that the two Rawlsian problems have the same maximum value and
unique solution χ∗.
Now consider the case x0 > x. The idea of the proof is that for any δ, the sequence
{xs(δ)}
∞
s=0 converges to x
δ with a speed sufficiently high and independent with the
choice of δ.
We prove that for any ǫ > 0, there exists T (ǫ) such that for any T ≥ T (ǫ), any
8
0 < δ < 1, we have
xδ < xT (δ)<x+ ǫ.
For each 0<δ < 1, consider a time s satisfying x0 ≥ x1(δ) ≥ · · · ≥ xs+1(δ) ≥ x+ ǫ.
Observe that f ′(x+ ǫ) < 1. Let f ′(x+ ǫ) = 1− ǫ1, with ǫ1> 0.
By Euler equations, we have
u′
(
f(xs(δ))− xs+1(δ)
)
= δu′
(
f(xs+1(δ))− xs+2(δ)
)
f ′(xs+1(δ))
≤ u′
(
f(xs+1(δ))− xs+2(δ)
)
f ′(xs+1(δ))
≤ u′
(
f(xs+1(δ))− xs+2(δ)
)
f ′(x+ ǫ)
≤ u′
(
f(xs+1(δ))− xs+2(δ)
)
− ǫ1u
′
(
f(xs+1(δ))− xs+2(δ)
)
≤ u′
(
f(xs+1(δ))− xs+2(δ)
)
− ǫ2,
for ǫ2 = ǫ1u
′
(
f(x0)
)
, since f(x0) ≥ f(xs+1(δ))−xs+2(δ). Observe that ǫ2 does not
depend on δ.
Since u is strictly concave, its derivative function u′ is strictly decreasing, this
implies the existence of some ǫ3 > 0 being independent with δ such that
f(xs(δ))− xs+1(δ)− ǫ3 ≥ f(xs+1(δ))− xs+2(δ).
Then we have
xs+1(δ)− xs+2(δ) ≤ f(xs(δ))− f(xs+1(δ))− ǫ3
≤ f ′(xs+1(δ))(xs(δ)− xs+1(δ))− ǫ3
≤ xs(δ)− xs+1(δ)− ǫ3.
Hence for T (ǫ) big enough such that x0 − T (ǫ)ǫ3 < 0, we have xT (δ) < x + ǫ for
any T ≥ T (ǫ) and for any 0<δ < 1. Otherwise we will have xT (δ)− xT+1(δ) ≤ 0
for some T ≥ T (ǫ): a contradiction4.
4It is well known that the solution of Ramsey problem converges monotonically to the steady
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By the independence of T (ǫ) in respect to δ, we have
lim
δ→1
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu
(
f(xs(δ))− xs+1(δ)
)]
= lim
δ→1

(1− δ) T (ǫ)∑
s=0
δsu
(
f(xs(δ))− xs+1(δ)
)
+ lim
δ→1

δT (ǫ)(1− δ) ∞∑
s=T (ǫ)+1
δs−T (ǫ)−1u
(
f(xs(δ))− xs+1(δ)
)
= lim
δ→1

δT (ǫ)(1− δ) ∞∑
s=T (ǫ)+1
δs−T (ǫ)−1u
(
f(xs(δ))− xs+1(δ)
)
≤ lim
δ→1
u
(
f(x+ ǫ)− xδ
)
.
For any feasible path χ ∈ Π(x0),
inf
0<δ<1
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
u
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)]
≤ lim
δ→1
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu
(
f(xs(δ))− xs+1(δ)
)]
≤ lim
δ→1
u
(
f(x+ ǫ)− xδ
)
= u
(
f(x+ ǫ)− x
)
.
Since ǫ > 0 is chosen arbitrarily, this implies
inf
0<δ<1
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
u
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)]
≤ u
(
f(x)− x
)
.
We then have
max
x∈Π(x0)
ν(x) = max
x∈Π(x0)
νˆ(x) = u
(
f(x)− x
)
.
For a solution of the problem with the second Rawlsian criterion, take for example
state.
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the sequence χˆ ∈ Π(x0) such that xˆs = x for any s ≥ 1. For each δ,
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
u
(
f(xˆs)− xˆs+1
)
= (1− δ)u
(
f(x0)− x
)
+ δu
(
f(x)− x
)
.
Since x0>x, the function (1− δ)u
(
f(x0)−x
)
+ δu
(
f(x)−x
)
is strictly decreasing
in respect to δ. This implies
inf
0<δ<1
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu
(
f(xˆs)− xˆs+1
)]
= lim
δ→1
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu
(
f(xˆs)− xˆs+1
)]
= u
(
f(x)− x
)
.
(ii) This property is proved by the arguments of part (i).
(iii) Consider some feasible path x∗ which is a solution of the problem under first
Rawls criterion. Since u
(
f(x∗s) − x
∗
s+1) ≥ u
(
f(x) − x) for any s ≥ 0, for any
0<δ < 1,
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu
(
f(x∗s)− x
∗
s+1
)
≥ u
(
f(x)− x
)
.
This implies
inf
0<δ< 1
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu
(
f(x∗s)− x
∗
s+1
)]
≥ u
(
f(x)− x
)
= max
x∈Π(x0)
inf
0<δ< 1
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)]
.
Hence x∗ is a solution of the problem under second Rawls criterion. The proof is
completed. QED
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3 Discussions
3.1 Rawls criteria and ambiguity
In recent decades, the is a large literature in decision theory, enlarging the world
of Savage [19], where the famous sure-thing princple is not satisfied. The seminar
work of Gilboa & Schmeidler [12] consider the behaviour under which the economic
agent maximizes the worst scenario. This makes us to make a link to the Rawlsian
criteria. Assume that the economic agent must choose a time discounting system in
order to evaluate the inter-temporal consumption streams. The set of possible time
discounting is ∆ = (π0, π1, π2, . . . ) such that πs> 0 for any s and
∑∞
s=0 πs = 1.
Behind the veil of ignorance, every time discounting system is possible. The
criterion is hence
U(c0, c1, c2, . . . ) = inf
π∈∆
[
∞∑
s=0
πsu(cs)
]
= inf
s≥0
u(cs),
which is the first Ralws criterion.
Now assume that the economic agent prefer to the time discounting system satis-
fying the usual properties as impatience, and stability. Let D be the set of such
time discounting system. In Chambers & Echenique [6], we found that:
D= {π ∈ ∆ such that ∃δ ∈ (0, 1) : πs = (1− δ)δ
s for all s ≥ 0} .
The criterion is then the second Rawlsian one.
3.2 Disussion about some criteria
The Ramsey criterion is criticized about putting privileges for the generations in
present and close future. In another way, other criterion, for example the lim inf
takes into account only the distant future. As a way to reconcile these to extremes,
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Chichilnisky in [8], [9] proposes a criterion satisfying her No-dictatorship of present
and of future. Her criterion is a convex combination of a Ramsey part and a lim inf
part5. The weakness of this criterion is that, being the convex sum of two parts
which are continuous in respect to different topologies, the optimisation problem
under this criterion generally has no solution. It is always difficult taking into
account at the same time the efficiency and the equality. For some discussion, see
Basu & Mitra [4].
As a response for this challenge, Alvarez-Cuadrado & Van Long [1] consider the
convex combination between a Ramsey part and a Rawlsian part, in the contin-
uous time configuration. They give a detailed description of the behaviour of the
economy 6. Another approach belongs to Asheim & Ekeland [3], who consider the
markovian solutions of the problem under Chichilnisky’s criterion, and prove that
the lim inf part has no effect on the optimal choice.
The overtaking criterion of Gale satisfies the two non-dictatorship properties of
Chichilnisky, but this criterion is not complete. If we focus only on the good
programs, as in Dana & Le Van [7], the optimal path converges to the golden rule.
As an attempt to avoid the non-completeness problem, Le Van & Morhaim [15]
consider the Ramsey problem and study the properties of the solution when the
discount rate converges to 1. They prove that the sequence of solutions converge
to the solution of under Gale’s criterion.
3.3 Technical concerns
And, last but not least, consider the case where f ′(∞) ≥ 1. In this case, x = ∞,
and for the two Rawlsian criteria, the only solution is to remains constant. And
if f ′(0) ≤ 1, every feasible path converges to zero, and the two problems becomes
trivial.
5For a discussion about Chichilnisky’s criterion, see Alvarez-Cuadrado & Van Long [1].
6For the discrete time configuration, see Ha-Huy & Nguyen [13].
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